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A new measure of dispersion is introduced as a representation of consensus (agreement) and dis-
sention (disagreement). Building on the generally accepted Shannon entropy, this measure utilizes a
probability distribution and the distance between categories to produce a value spanning the unit
interval. The measure is applied to the Likert scale (or any ordinal scale) to determine degrees of
consensus or agreement. Using this measure, data on ordinal scales can be given a value of dispersion
that is both logically and theoretically sound.
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The problem of understanding the complexities of group decision-making is well stud-
ied [3,6,9,11–13,16] but the ancillary problem of identifying a measure by which one can
determine if a group of individuals is converging on consensus remains elusive, although
much work has been recently conducted [1,4,5,14].
It is common for a group of well-intentioned individuals, engaged in purposeful
dialogue, to utilize the concept of consensus in making decisions, especially when it is0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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which parliamentary procedure is achieved, was developed in 1876 by Henry Robert, and
has gone through numerous revisions. It remains the deﬁnitive authority for the running of
meetings in America and is available for purchase in virtually every bookstore. While not
recognized in many other parts of the world, it is commonplace in the United States. For
readers unfamiliar with these rules of procedure, it is impossible to oﬀer any enlightenment
within this article.
These rules of order, while eﬀective, usually result in someone or some group, ‘‘losing’’
in the resulting decision. When the Chair calls for a vote having ‘‘sensed’’ that all partic-
ipants are in agreement, it is entirely possible that the Chair’s feelings are incorrect.
Although consensus building is a typical method used in decision-making, few measures
exist which allow for the easy determination of the degree to which a group is nearing
the point of agreement. Agreement is more than acceptance or rejection, for agreement
can be represented by any category or range of responses. Usually a group of individuals
is more apt to respond individually to the statement, ‘‘In my judgment the group has
attained consensus,’’ as strongly agree, agree, unsure, disagree, or strongly disagree.
A Likert scale (described below) usually represents these categories; such scales are ordinal
measures. Ordinal scales are ordered categories with the diﬀerences between each category
not being important.
Hence the problem is one of determining a categorical consensus involving the limited
attributes of ordinal measures. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a mathematical
measure that permits a logical determination of dispersion around a category value. Since
the measure can used to determine a group consensus by utilizing a Likert scale for data
collection, the measure is called consensus and its complement is dissention.
2. The likert scale
Within the scales of measurement exist four well-known measures:
(a) Nominal data that is used merely in classiﬁcation, like a gender (male or female), in
which order plays no role. It would make no sense to order Male > Female. Labels
used in nominal scales are arbitrary and can be nouns (or any string), numbers (real,
integer, etc.), or any possible type of labeling. Even if integers are used they convey
no sense of numbering since they merely represent categories.
(b) Ordinal data are ordered categories and used typically in all languages to convey a
sense of approximate ordering, for example, tea water may be said to be cold, luke-
warm, tepid, warm, very warm, quite hot, hot, very hot, etc. The categories are them-
selves the values. Hence, it makes no sense to say that the average between warm and
very warm is warm and one-half, and thus the values between the categories are not
important. The Likert scale is used to collect data by means of categories, and it is a
common means of data collection in such ﬁelds as sociology, psychology and med-
icine. The kinds of data frequently collected involve the determining of attitude or
feelings with respect to some attribute.
(c) Interval data consists of a constant scale, ordered, but without a natural zero such as
a temperature under the Fahrenheit scale. 0 is less than 50, and there deﬁnitely
exist intermediate values such as 45.255. With the right kind of instrumentation
one could determine temperature to some extreme decimal, but without a natural
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molecular motion and is hence a natural zero, it is not reasonable to say that 80 is
twice as hot as 40. However, subtraction and addition of values is permitted and
makes sense.
(d) Ratio data is ordered, possesses a constant scale, and has a natural zero. The number
line is such a scale and it is common to say that someone weighing 150 kg is twice as
heavy as one weighing 75 kg.
The Likert scale is a unidimensional scaling method in that concepts are usually easier
to understand when expressed in a single dimension. For example, one is either taller or
shorter, runs faster or runs slower, or is hotter or colder. The scale is usually expressed as
a statement with categories of choices, usually ranging from strongly agree to strongly
disagree. An individual makes a selection usually by checking the category or blackening
in a bubble sheet choice. There is a choice to be made, and it must consist of one and
only one category. If we give the Likert instrument to n number of participants, we
can create a frequency table of the categories selected. At issue is how to best analyze
the data. This is an important issue, for much research literature is analyzed using ‘‘. . .
means and standard deviation and performs parametric analysis such as ANOVA . . .
no statement is made about an assumption of interval status for Likert data, and no
argument made in support’’ [19]. Finally, Jamison [19] says ‘‘that the average of ‘fair’
and ‘good’ is not ‘fair-and-a-half’; this is true even when one assigns integers to represent
‘fair’ and ‘good’!
The focus of this paper is to identify a measure that can logically be used to analyze
ordinal data, principally using the Likert scale method.
3. Consensus and dissention
We consider consensus and dissention to be diametrical concepts. A consensus is an
opinion or position reached by a group of individuals acting as a whole; it is also consid-
ered general agreement. Dissention is deﬁned as a diﬀerence of opinion such that strife is
caused within the group undertaking to make a decision. We deﬁne consensus as comple-
mentary to dissention. However, the purpose of this section centers on the understanding
and measurement of the concept of consensus.
In researching the various meanings of consensus it becomes apparent that there exists
a richness of content (as this paper is being written) that is reﬂected in a modest Internet
search, yielding some 6.6 million hits. As we begin to investigate this richness, the dupli-
cation and the variations of the application of the term ‘‘consensus’’ directed us to a site [2]
providing a rather complete deﬁnition of consensus. A portion of Section 4 is derived from
this site under the generous terms of the GNV Free Documentation License.
4. Issues in consensus
Consensus has two common meanings. One is a general agreement among the members
of a given group or community; the other is as a theory and practice of getting such agree-
ments. Many discussions focus on whether agreement needs to be unanimous and even
dictionary deﬁnitions of consensus vary. These discussions miss the point of consensus,
which is not a voting system but a taking seriously of everyone’s input, and a trust in each
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action want to hear from those who oppose it because they do not wish to impose, and
they trust that the ensuing conversation will beneﬁt everyone. Action despite opposition
will be rare and done with attention to minimizing damage to relationships. In a sense,
consensus simply refers to how any group of people who value liberty might work
together.
4.1. Consensus as collective thought
A close equivalent phrase to consensus might be ‘‘the collective opinion of a group’’,
keeping in mind that some degree of variation is still possible among individuals. This var-
iation remains important, especially if there must be individual commitment to follow up
the decision with action. There is considerable debate and research into both collective
intelligence and consensus decision-making, and although these phrases lend themselves
to being measured utilizing the tool described in this paper, we leave this important area
of collective opinion for others to discuss.
‘‘Consensus’’ often involves compromise. Rather than one opinion being adopted by a
plurality, all stakeholder views are encouraged (often with facilitation) until a convergent
decision is developed. If this is done in a purely methodological way it can result in simple
trading – we will sacriﬁce this if you will sacriﬁce that. Genuine consensus typically
requires more focus on developing the relationships among stakeholders, so that the com-
promises they achieve are based on willing consent – we want to give this to you, and we
want you to give that to us only because you desire it. Consensus is something that one
‘‘feels’’ during a discussion, not unlike the assignment of a category to some attribute
as occurs with a Likert scale survey. As a group of well-intentioned individuals continues
to discuss an issue, there comes a time when the atmosphere is such that (at least) the lea-
der recognizes the time has arrived to either bring the matter to a vote, or to proclaim that
agreement is ‘‘close enough’’ for all and that they should move on. Proximity to consensus,
as determined by a mathematical equation, allows the leader to determine the speed with
which the issue is being addressed and possibly how long the matter should be discussed
until such time that a vote might be taken.
5. Models of consensus
In mathematical terms see [7], we might naively start by envisioning the distribution of
opinions in a population as a Gaussian distribution in one parameter, or perhaps bimodal
or even tri-modal. We would then say that the initial step in a consensus process would be
the written or spoken synthesis that represents the range of opinions within perhaps three
standard deviations of the mean opinion. Other standards are possible, e.g. two standard
deviations, or possibly only one. Unfortunately, using these ideas does not result in an
easy and convenient way of determining proximity to consensus, or the ability of making
comparisons of diﬀerent issues.
5.1. Drawbacks
Business and political analysts have pointed out a number of problems with consensus
decision-making. A too-strict requirement of consensus may eﬀectively give a small self-
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extremely long time to occur, and thus may be intolerable for urgent matters, e.g. decisions
involving strategic policy or competitive advantage. In some cases, consensus decision
making may encourage groupthink, a situation in which people modify their opinions
to reﬂect what they believe others want them to think, leading to a situation in which a
group makes a decision that none of the members individually think is wise. It can also
lead to a few dominant individuals making all decisions. Finally, consensus decision-mak-
ing may fail in a situation where there simply is no agreement possible, and interests are
irreconcilable.5.2. Examples and varying deﬁnitions of consensus
Szmidt and Kacprzyk [14] provide an interesting look at consensus from the perspective
of individual intuitionistic fuzzy preference relations by which a distance from consensus
can be determined. Using the unit interval, they deﬁne complete disagreement as being
equal to 0, and complete agreement as 1. We agree with this range. This is superior to
the method of merely using a mean and some measure of variance to determine proximity
to consensus, as we shall show below. Thus, the unit interval indicates the range of all pos-
sible values of consensus.
Herrera, et. al [1] examines consensus from the perspective of linguistic labels: certain,
extremely likely, most likely, meaning full chance, it may, small chance, very low chance,
extremely unlikely, and impossible. After considerable matrix computation, they deter-
mine that a consensus measure is determined by degrees: level of preference, level of alter-
native, and the level of relation. A typical group of non-academics, such as business
managers or politicians, might be challenged in determining how to utilize this measure
because of its mathematical complexity. We contend that our measure is easy to calculate,
logical to the non-mathematician, and relatively simple to understand (excluding the
mathematical proof).
Tcha et al. [15] wrote a paper analyzing PhD student reﬂections, using the following
equation to assign a value from the unit interval as a measure of consensus. Initially, this
appears to be a nice application of the Shannon Entropy equation:Consensus ¼ 1
P
pi  lnðpiÞ
n 1=n lnð1=nÞ ð1Þwhere p is the probability associated with the distribution under consideration, i is an in-
dex, and n is the number of categories.
However, the measure seems unsatisfactory upon closer inspection. One of the attri-
butes of the entropy equation is its ability to measure the amount of uncertainty associated
with any probability distribution. Hence, given a probability distribution on n categories,
there are n! ways in which the categories can be ordered within each distribution. Each sep-
arate ordering of the distribution will have the same entropy value associated with each,
for it is a principle of entropy that the ordering of the categories within a distribution
not eﬀect the entropy value. Entropy is constant regardless of the order of the categories
within the distribution. This is exactly in opposition to the requirements essential to a con-
sensus measure.
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Consensus is a function of shared group feelings towards an issue. This ‘‘feeling’’ can be
captured through a Likert scale that measures the extent to which a person agrees or dis-
agrees with the question.
For example
Question: ‘‘I found the software easy to use . . .’’
1. Strongly agree.
2. Somewhat agree.
3. Undecided.
4. Somewhat disagree.
5. Strongly disagree.
Other number-assignments can be made, such as2 = Strongly agree 0.00 = Strongly agree
1 = Agree 0.25 = Agree
0 = Not sure, 0.50 = Not sure,
1 = Disagree, and 0.75 = Disagree, and
2 = Strongly disagree 1.00 = Strongly disagreeThe categories of strongly agree, agree, etc. are ordered, but without any sense of interval
distance such as would exist in an interval or ratio scale. The numbers are little more than
another way of labeling the categories. To suggest that the average of agree and strongly
agree is agree and a half makes no sense, especially when using an ordinal scale. Likert scales
can also be designed with a diﬀerent number of categories; usually from two to nine catego-
ries are used to convert subjective opinions to ordinal values. The issues of scale, symmetry,
selection of clusters, and ordinal vs. interval data are not addressed here, but Munshi [8]
describes these aspects in straightforward terms and also contains an excellent bibliography.
We establish a set of rules that must be satisﬁed before any measure can be considered a
viable solution to the Likert scale consensus problem.
1. For a given (even) number of individuals participating in a discussion on some question
of interest, if an equal number of individuals, n/2, separate themselves into two disjoint
groups, each centered on the strongly disagree and strongly agree categories, the group
is considered to have no consensus.
2. If all the participants classify themselves in the same category of the Likert scale,
regardless of the category, then the consensus of the group is considered to be complete
at 100%.
3. If the mix of participants is such that n/2 + 1 participants assigns themselves to any one
category, the degree of consensus must be greater than 0, for the balance in the group is
no longer equal at the extreme categories.
Hence, a complete lack of consensus generates a value of 0, and a complete consensus of
opinion yields a value of 1. Every other combination of Likert scale categories must result
in a value within the unit interval. The issue of classiﬁcation of individuals into Likert
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a matter beyond the limits of this paper and is not addressed.7. Some standard statistical considerations and the shannon entropy
Given a standard 5-category Likert scale we examine the use of the mean and standard
deviation as a measure of dispersion along with the Shannon Entropy [10] and the new
proposed measure, the Consensus. A typical 5-category Likert scale would use the catego-
ries Strongly Disagree (SD), Disagree (D), Neutral (N), Agree (A), and Strongly Agree
(SA). We assign these categories ordinal values SD = 1, D = 2, N = 3, A = 4, and SA = 5.
Let us suppose that we ask 100 people the question in Section 6 ‘‘I found the software
easy to use . . .’’ and tabulate the results. We then calculate the mean, standard deviation,
Shannon entropy, and Consensus of the data.
Let us assume that 19 people chose Strongly Disagree, 16 people Disagree, 26 people
are Neutral, 29 people Agree, and 10 people Strongly Agree. Then the mean is
lX ¼
Xn
i¼1
piX i ¼
19
100
 1þ 16
100
 2þ 26
100
 3þ 29
100
 4þ 10
100
 5 ¼ 2:95 ð2Þ
where pi is the probability (relative frequency) of outcome Xi (which ranges from 1 to 5).
A histogram of this data is shown in Fig. 1.
The Shannon entropy involves only the probabilities pi and is calculated with the
formula
EntðX Þ ¼ 
Xn
i¼1
pilog2ðpiÞ ð3Þ
Using the example data we calculate the Shannon entropy as
EntðX Þ ¼ 
Xn
i¼1
pilog2ðpiÞ
¼  19
100
log2
19
100
 
 16
100
log2
16
100
 
 26
100
log2
26
100
 
 29
100
log2
29
100
 
 10
100
log2
10
100
 
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CnsðX Þ ¼ 1þ
Xn
i¼1
pilog2 1
jX i  lX j
dX
 
ð5Þ
where lX is the mean of X and dX is the width of X, dX = Xmax  Xmin.
Using the example data with mean lX = 2.95, and dX = 5  1 = 4 we calculate the Con-
sensus as
CnsðX Þ ¼ 1þ
Xn
i¼1
pilog2 1
jX i  lX j
dX
 
¼ 1þ 19
100
log2 1
j1 2:95j
4
 
þ 16
100
log2 1
j2 2:95j
4
 
þ 29
100
log2 1
j3 2:95j
4
 
þ 30
100
log2 1
j4 2:95j
4
 
þ 10
100
log2 1
j5 2:95j
4
 
¼ 0:518 ð6Þ
The following table shows the mean, standard deviation, entropy, and Consensus for
various frequencies of responses to a Likert scale question. Row D is the data from the
preceding example.
It is reasonable to expect that as the views of individuals change and begin to coalesce
on a common category, the measure should begin to converge towards a maximum. Note
that the mean and standard deviation are identical for Rows F and G. Intuitively there is
more of a consensus in row G than row F because a large number of respondents (70%) in
G have selected one category (neutral). Row F shows 20% of respondents disagree, 20%
agree, and 40% are neutral; there is no large congregation of respondent values in any sin-
gle category like that seen in Row G. Hence, neither the mean, standard deviation, nor
entropy measure is adequate to capture proximities in ordinal scales. Row H and Row
I illustrate the possibility of having identical consensus values as long as the order in which
the probabilities occur remains constant.
If all the participants claim a single category, then it is assumed that all are in agreement
and hence, consensus is satisﬁed. This is the situation in Row J.
The table is presented in increasing order of Consensus. It is the authors’ opinion that
the data is also increasing in consensus. The standard deviation generally decreases as con-
sensus increases. In Rows E and F, however, this is not the case. Row E shows respon-
dents in bimodal, noncontiguous groups. Clearly there is something of a conﬂict. Row
F, however, shows respondents in every category, but with the largest number occurring
in one category (neutral in this case) while tapering oﬀ to the ends. From this distribution
one would gather that the category conﬂict present in E is lessened in F.
A word about the use of the standard deviation in calculating dispersions of ordinal
scale data: the calculation of a standard deviation requires the presence of a ratio scale,
something, by deﬁnition, absent from an ordinal scale. Some researchers do use the stan-
dard deviation to explain ordinal data, but such an assumption is false [19]. Therefore, the
argument that the standard deviation captures dispersion equally well as the consensus
Table 1
SD D N A SA Mean StdDev Ent Cns
1 2 3 4 5
A 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00
B 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.25 3.00 1.58 2.00 0.29
C 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 3.00 1.41 1.86 0.43
D 0.19 0.16 0.26 0.29 0.10 2.95 1.27 1.73 0.52
E 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 0.58
F 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.10 3.00 1.10 2.12 0.63
G 0.15 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.15 3.00 1.10 1.18 0.70
H 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.50 0.50 1.00 0.81
I 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 2.50 0.50 1.00 0.81
J 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
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agreed-to zero point, clearly not deﬁned in ordinal scales (Table 1).
8. The measure of consensus and the rules
For the illustration represented in Table 2 we see the consensus measure, Cns, for each
row with 50% Strongly Agreeing and 50% Strongly Disagreeing is zero. The number of
individuals participating in the group does not have any impact on the value of consensus
and Rule #1 of Section 5 is satisﬁed. Note that the last row of Table 2 illustrates a very
modest shift of one person from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree. That change causes
the balance to shift slightly towards the SD side of the Likert Scale, the result being a very
slight increase in the degree of consensus. This is Rule #2 of Section 5.
Rule #3 states that as the number of participants in the group shifts their judgment
such that the categories begin to gravitate towards a central value, the degree of consensus
must also correspondingly increase to reﬂect agreement. Hence, the degree of proximity
increases as the numbers of individuals in the group adjust their perceptions about the
question or issue under discussion and move towards agreement. Table 3 shows a move-
ment in proximity from complete opposition to complete agreement. Note that the ﬁnal
row represents the total of all group members.
Finally, as the number of participants increases in size, the consensus measure should
not be aﬀected. Regardless of the number of participants, the proportion of the group
in each category is constant and hence, the measure of consensus remains unchanged
(see Table 4).Table 2
Lack of consensus data
SD D N A SA Cns
5 0 0 0 5 0
50 0 0 0 50 0
500 0 0 0 500 0
5000 0 0 0 5000 0
51 0 0 0 49 0.0003
Table 3
The movement coalescence towards a single category
SD D N A SA Cns
5 0 0 0 5 0
5 0 0 5 0 0.30
5 0 5 0 0 0.51
5 5 0 0 0 0.81
10 0 0 0 0 1
Note that the consensus ranges from 0 to 1.
Table 4
As the number of members in the group increases, the consensus remains constant as long as the category
percentages remain constant
SD D N A SA Cns
0 1 0 3 0 0.57
0 10 0 30 0 0.57
0 20 0 60 0 0.57
0 30 0 90 0 0.57
0 300 0 900 0 0.57
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of the data.
Proposition 1 (Transform). Let Y be a discrete random variable of size n with probability
distribution p(x). If
X ¼ aY þ b ð7Þ
with a not equal to zero then Cns(X) = Cns(Y).Proof. It is well known that a linear transform of the data performs a linear transform on
the mean, so that
lX ¼ alY þ b ð8Þ
Since Eq. (7) is a linear transform that preserves order we know that
dX ¼ Xmax  Xmin ¼ ðaY max þ bÞ  ðaY min þ bÞ ¼ aðY max  Y minÞ ð9Þ
If we substitute these two expressions, as well as the deﬁnition of Xi into Cns(X) we get,
CnsðX Þ ¼ 1þ
Xn
i¼1
pilog2 1
jX i  lX j
dX
 
¼ 1þ
Xn
i¼1
pilog2 1
j aY i þ bð Þ  alY þ bð Þj
aðY max  Y minÞ
 
¼ 1þ
Xn
i¼1
pilog2 1
jY i  lY j
dY
 
¼ CnsðY Þ ð10Þ
since dY is positive. h
W.J. Tastle, M.J. Wierman / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 45 (2007) 531–545 541Corollary 1. If Y is a discrete random variable as given in the Transform Theorem and X is
given by
X i ¼ Y i  Y minY max  Y min ¼
Y i  Y min
dY
ð11Þ
then
CnsðX Þ ¼ CnsðY Þ ¼ 1þ
Xn
i¼1
pilog2ð1 jX i  lX jÞ ð12Þ9. The mathematics of dissention and consensus
The authors have developed an information measure called the Consensus, which takes
a histogram or probability distribution over a discrete set of choices with ordinal values,
and produces a single value that ranges from 0 for complete disagreement, to 1 for com-
plete agreement. The following discussion establishes deﬁnitions and demonstrates the
bounds of the Consensus measure.
Deﬁnition 1. Let X be a discrete random variable of size n with probability distribution
p(X). As usual lX is the mean of X and let dX = Xmax  Xmin be the width of X. Finally let
di = jXi  lXj be the absolute deviation of X from the mean. The Consensus, Cns(X), is
then deﬁned to be
CnsðX Þ ¼ 1þ
Xn
i¼1
pilog2
dX  di
dX
 
¼ 
Xn
i¼1
pilog2 1
jX i  lX j
dX
 
ð13Þ
If there is no chance of confusion then we will drop the subscripts and write
CnsðX Þ ¼ 1þ
Xn
i¼1
pilog2 1
jX i  lj
d
 
ð14Þ
The mirror image of consensus is dissention. It has the following form:
DntðX Þ ¼ 
Xn
i¼1
pilog2
dX  di
dX
 
¼ 
Xn
i¼1
pilog2 1
jX i  lX j
dX
 
ð15Þ
Again, if there is no chance of confusion then we will drop the subscripts and write
DntðX Þ ¼ 
Xn
i¼1
pilog2 1
jX i  lj
d
 
ð16Þ
The Dissention is one minus the Consensus, Dnt(X) = 1  Cns(X), the main mathemat-
ical result of the following section will justify this deﬁnition. The Dissention has the usual
form of a measure of information, and we will use the Dissention in the proofs that follow.
In the demonstration in the following subsection we will assume that any random
variable Y has been transformed into a random variable X using the transformation
X i ¼ Y i  Y minY max  Y min ¼
Y i  Y min
dY
ð17Þ
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DntðX Þ ¼ 
Xn
i¼1
pilog2ð1 jX i  lX jÞ ð18Þ
where Xmin = 0, Xmax = 1, and dX = 1.9.1. Bounds of the dissention measure
We are going to show that the Dissention is bounded below by zero and above by one.
This immediately implies that its mirror, the Consent, given in Eq. (13) is also bounded
below by zero and above by one. Trivially, the dissention measure is positive since each
individual term in the summation given by Eq. (12) is positive.
Let X1,X2, . . . ,Xn, be n values in ascending order with X1 = 0 and Xn = 1 and probabil-
ity distribution p(x). Assume that all the Xi are distinct.
Then lp = Ep(X) is the expected value or mean of X under the probability distribution
p(x) and EpðX Þ ¼
Pn
i¼1xi.
Deﬁne ak for k = 1,2, . . . ,n as
ak ¼ 1 X k ð19Þ
so that
1 ak ¼ X k ð20Þ
Pick a k, where 1 < k < n and let us construct the probability distribution q, where
q1 ¼ p1 þ akpk
qk ¼ 0
qi ¼ pi for i 6¼ 1; k; n
qn ¼ pn þ ð1 akÞpk
ð21Þ
First we note that
Pn
i¼1 ¼
Pn
i¼1 ¼ 1 and that the construction also leaves the mean
ﬁxed, lp(X) = lq(X). Both of these equalities can be shown by directly calculating the sums
involved, a trivial bit of algebraic manipulation that we omit from this paper.
The transformation from p to q in Eq. (21) can trace its ancestry back to [17]. A good
exposition on Muirhead’s inequality is contained in [18].
Let g(X) = log(1  jX  lj) and set
A ¼ Ep½gðX Þ
B ¼ Eq½gðX Þ
ð22Þ
as the expected value of g(X) under the probability distributions p and q, respectively. Let
e = A  B. When we calculate e most of the terms are identical in A and B and cancel each
other out. Only the terms with index i = 1, i = k, and i = n have diﬀerent probabilities pi
and qi. It turns out that after some algebraic manipulation the value of e is given by
e ¼ pk½gðX kÞ  akgðX 1Þ  ð1 akÞgðXnÞ ð23Þ
Since g(X) is convex we know
gðXkÞ 6 akgðX 1Þ þ 1 akð ÞgðXnÞ ð24Þ
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akX 1 þ ð1 akÞXn ¼ ak0þ ð1 akÞ1 ¼ Xk ð25Þ
and e is therefore negative. So we have that A 6 B or
Ep½gðX Þ 6 Eq½gðX Þ ð26Þ
Note that the probability distribution q that is constructed keeps the mean ﬁxed so that
lp = lp = l and sets qk = 0. If we repeat the construction n  2 times for all interior points
X2,X3, . . . ,Xn1 then we arrive at a probability distribution q 0 where
q01 ¼ 1 lp
q0i ¼ 0 for i 6¼ 1; n
q0n ¼ lp
ð27Þ
The distribution q 0 must be the ﬁnal distribution. The construction given by Eq. (21)
keeps the mean constant so that both equations
q01 þ q0n ¼ 1 ð28Þ
and
q010þ q0n1 ¼ lp ð29Þ
must hold.
By induction, it must also be true that
Ep½gðX Þ 6 Eq0 ½gðX Þ ð30Þ
since construction given by Eq. (21) increases the expectation of X. If we substitute the dis-
tribution q 0 into the above equation we get
Ep½gðX Þ 6 q01gð0Þ þ q0ngð1Þ ð31Þ
where
q01gð0Þ þ q0ngð1Þ ¼ ð1 lpÞ logð1 lpÞ  lp logðlpÞ ð32ÞTheorem 1. If X is a discrete random variable of size nP 2 with Xmin = 0 and Xmax = 1 then
Dnt(X) 6 1.Proof. With Ymin = 0 and Ymax = 1 the mean l of Y must be between 0 and 1. In Eq. (32)
the right hand side is the Shannon entropy of the distribution (l, 1  l) which is well
known to be bounded above by one. hCorollary 2. If X is a discrete random variable of size nP 2 then Dnt(X) 6 1.Proof. Since the Dissent is invariant under linear transform we can apply the previous
theorem. h
544 W.J. Tastle, M.J. Wierman / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 45 (2007) 531–545Corollary 3. If X is a discrete random variable of size nP 2 then
0 6 DntðX Þ 6 Ent Xmax  lX
dX
;
lX  Xmin
dX
 
6 1 ð33Þ10. Relating dissention to other statistics
The Consensus and Dissent measure have been deﬁned as Expected values. The Dissent
is the expected value of the log of one minus the relative distance of Xi from the mean,
DntðX Þ ¼ E log2 1 jX ilX jdX
 h i
. It is known that the expected value of the squared dis-
tance E[(Xi  a)2] is minimized if a = lX, the mean, and that the expected value of the
absolute distance E[jXi  aj] is minimized if a = mY, the median. The squared distance
is used because it is easier to deal with analytically. Empirical results have shown that nei-
ther the mean nor the median minimize the expression DntðX Þ ¼ E log2 1 jX iajdX
 h i
viewed as a function of a. However these same empirical results have shown that the mean
of X generally gives a lower value than the median to the dissent.11. Conclusion
The Consensus can be easily measured and gives an value by which comparisons of dif-
ferent Likert distributions can be easily understood and that matches human intuition.
With a solution range in the unit interval, this application can be applied as a measure
of dispersion. It can also be used to augment other statistical measures, such as the v2 dis-
tributions, in better understanding distributions in which the absolute degree of variance is
an important consideration.
In this paper we have shown the deﬁnition, proofs, and usefulness of the Consensus
measure as a means by which various distributions on the Likert scale can be compared.
Using this measure it is easy to determine degrees of Consensus (or Dissention, the inverse
of Consensus) in an application of the Likert scale.Acknowledgements
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